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Abstract. We develop methods to evaluate whether a political districting accurately represents
the will of the people. To explore and showcase our ideas, we concentrate on the congressional dis-
tricts for the U.S. House of Representatives and use the state of North Carolina and its redistrictings
since the 2010 census. Using a Monte Carlo algorithm, we randomly generate over 24,000 redis-
trictings that are non-partisan and adhere to criteria from proposed legislation. Applying historical
voting data to these random redistrictings, we find that the number of democratic and republican
representatives elected varies drastically depending on how districts are drawn. Some results are
more common, and we gain a clear range of expected election outcomes. Using the statistics of
our generated redistrictings, we critique the particular congressional districtings used in the 2012
and 2016 NC elections as well as a districting proposed by a bipartisan redistricting commission.
We find that the 2012 and 2016 districtings are highly atypical and not representative of the will
of the people. On the other hand, our results indicate that a plan produced by a bipartisan panel
of retired judges is highly typical and representative. Since our analyses are based on an ensemble
of reasonable redistrictings of North Carolina, they provide a baseline for a given election which
incorporates the geometry of the state’s population distribution.
1. The Will of the People
Democracy is typically equated with expressing the will of the people through government.
Perceived failures of democracy in representative governments are usually attributed to the voice
of the people being muted and obstructed by the actions of special interests or the sheer size of
government. The underlying assumption is that the will of the people exists as a clear, well defined
voice which only needs to be better heard. Yet the will of the people is not monolithic. It is not
always so simple to obtain a consensus or even a clear majority opinion. We rely on our elections
as a proxy to express our collective opinions and our political will, which leads to the question, how
effective a given election is at capturing this will?
In the United States, district representation schemes are used to divide the population into dis-
tinct groups, each of which carries a certain amount of representation. This districting acknowledges
that the people’s voice is geographically diverse and that we value the expression of that diversity in
our government. We take election results to represent the people’s will, giving the elected officials a
mandate to act in the people’s name. Hence, it is reasonable to ask if and how this representation
is affected by the choice of district boundaries. Just how sensitive are election results, and by
extension, our impression of the people’s will, to our choices for geographic divisions? The method
we use to reveal this will is simple. We take the actual votes cast by North Carolinians at the 2012
and 2016 congressional elections and then change the boundaries of the congressional districts to
see how the partisan results of the elections change. Our results show that the will of the people is
not a single election outcome but rather a distribution of possible outcomes. The exact same vote
counts can lead to drastically different outcomes depending on the choice of districts.
compMany discussions of fraudulent elections emphasize voter suppression or voter fraud. How-
ever if the results of an election vary so widely over different choices of redistrictings, then it is
paramount that the districts employed produce results that are an accurate proxy of the “will of
the people.” The courts have given some guidance in this direction by promoting the “one person,
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one vote” standard,1 requiring districts have roughly an equal number of eligible voters so that
each elected representative is a proxy for the same number of constituents. We will demonstrate
that the commonly promoted criteria for the construction of redistricting (equal population appor-
tionment, geographical compactness, and preservation of historical constituencies) still leave a lot
of variability in the election results for a given set of precinct level votes. Given this variability, we
can ask if a given redistricting leads to a common and expected outcome, or if it gives one party
an unlikely advantage.
In the 2012 congressional elections, which were based on the 2010 redistricting, four out of
the thirteen congressional seats were filled by Democrats. However, in seeming contradiction, the
majority of votes were cast for Democratic candidates on the statewide level. The election results
hinged on the geographic positioning of congressional districts. While this outcome is clearly the
result of politically drawn districts, perhaps it is not the result of excessive tampering. Our country
has a long history of balancing the rights of urban areas with high population with those of more
rural, less populated areas. Our federalist and electoral structures enshrined the idea that majority
rule must be balanced with regionalism. It might be that in North Carolina, the subversion of the
results of the global vote count would happen in any redistricting which balances the representation
of the urban with the rural or the beach with the mountains, and each with the Piedmont. Maybe
the vast majority of reasonable districts which one might draw would have these issues due to the
geography of the population’s distribution.2 We are left asking the basic question: how much does
the outcome depend on the choice of districts? This can be further refined by asking “what are the
outcomes for a typical choice of districts,” or “when should a redistricting be considered outside
the norm?” These last two refinements require some way of quantifying what the typical outcomes
are for a given set of votes. We therefore set the vote counts based on historical data and ask how
changing the districts these votes were counted in leads to different results. Since we will explore
these questions in the context of the American political system, we will assume that people vote
for parties, not people. In these polarized times this is a reasonable approximation and we find the
results extremely illuminating.
In order to change the district boundaries, we use a Markov Chain Monte Carlo algorithm to
produce about 24,000 random but reasonable redistrictings.3 The redistrictings are constructed
using non-partisan design criteria from a proposed piece of legislation. We then re-tally the actual
historic votes from the 2012 or 2016 elections to produce about 24,000 election outcomes, one for
each of our generated redistrictings. We observe that the number of representatives elected from a
party can vary drastically depending on the redistricting used, yet some outcomes are more frequent
than others.
Once we understand the extent to which election results can vary over a collection of possible
redistrictings, we quantify how representative a particular redistricting is by observing its place
in this collection of results. Similarly, with statistics of typical redistrictings in hand, we devise
measures of gerrymandering where the effects of packing (concentrating voters to lower their po-
litical power) and cracking (fragmenting voting blocks to lower their political power) can be better
identified. Since all of our analysis is based on the interaction of actual votes with the collection
of over 24,000 reasonable redistrictings, it provides a baseline for the election which is informed by
both the geometry of the state and the distribution of the electorate though out the state. It is an
important feature of our analysis that our techniques incorporate the effect of the state’s geometry
when developing the baseline.
We apply our metrics to analyze and critique the North Carolina U.S. Congressional redistrictings
used in the 2012 and 2016 elections, as well as the redistrictings developed by a bipartisan group of
1Wesberry v. Sanders (1964)
2In [3], it was shown that redistrictings may favor a party simply due to the geography of the state.
3The algorithm is similar to the ones presented in [16, 1, 9].
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retired Judges as part of the “Beyond Gerrymandering” project spearheaded by Thomas Ross. We
refer to these redistrictings of interest as NC2012, NC2016, and Judges respectively. See Figures 20–
22 in the Appendix for visualizations of these redistrictings. Our analysis uses the actual votes cast
in the 2012 and 2016 N.C. congressional elections to illuminate the structure and features of a
redistricting.
Using a related methodology, we also assess the degree to which the three redistrictings (NC2012,
NC2016, and Judges) are engineered. This is done by seeing how close their properties are to the
collection of redistrictings that can be obtained by small changes. It seems reasonable that the
character of an election should not be overly sensitive to small changes in the redistricting if the
concept of the “will of the people” is to have any meaning.
The results of our analysis repeatedly show that the NC2012 and NC2016 redistrictings are
heavily engineered and produce results that are extremely atypical and at odds with the will of
the people. Finer analysis clearly shows that the Democratic voters are clearly packed into a few
districts, decreasing their power, while Republican voters are spread more evenly, thus increasing
their power. In contrast, election results from the Judges redistricting are quite typical, producing
results consistent with what is typically seen. We emphasize that all of these conclusions come from
asking what the typical character and result of an election is if we use a “reasonable” redistricting
adhering to proposed legislation and drawn at random without any partisan input, save the possible
effect of ensuring a few districts contain a sufficient minority population to comply with the Voting
Rights Act (VRA).
2. Main Results: Where do you draw the line?
We emphasize from the start that in contrast to some works (see, for example, we are not propos-
ing an automated method of creating redistrictings to be used in practice. Rather, we are proposing
a class of ideas for evaluating whether a redistricting is truly representative or gerrymandered. We
hope this helps draw the line between fair and biased redistricting so that the will of the people
can be better heard.
Our analysis begins by generating over 24,000 “reasonable” redistrictings of North Carolina into
thirteen U.S. House congressional districts. For each redistricting, we tabulate the votes from a
previous election, either 2012 or 2016, to calculate the number of representatives elected from both
the Democratic and Republican Parties. We emphasize that we use the actual votes from either
the 2012 or 2016 U.S. House of Representative elections. In using these votes, we assume that a
vote cast for a Republican or Democrat remains so even when district boundaries are shifted.
By “reasonable,” we mean districts which are drawn in a nonpartisan fashion, guided only by
the desire to:
• Divide the state population evenly between the thirteen districts.
• Keep the districts geographically connected and compact.
• Refrain from splitting counties as much as possible.
• Ensure that African-American voters are sufficiently concentrated in two districts to give
them a reasonable chance to affect the winner.
The precise meaning of “reasonable” is given in Section 3, along with the method we used to
generate the over 24,000 “reasonable” redistrictings. We construct our districts by taking Voting
Tabulation Districts (VTD) from NC2012 as the fundamental atomic element used as our building
blocks. North Carolina is composed of over 2,600 VTDs.
The first criterion above enforces the “one-person-one-vote” doctrine, which dictates that each
representative should represent a roughly equal number of people. The second criterion reflects
the desire to have districts represent regional interests. The third criterion embodies the idea
that districts should not fracture historical political constituencies if possible; counties provide a
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convenient surrogate for these constituencies. The last criterion, which is dictated by the Voting
Rights Act (VRA), asks that two districts have enough African-American voters that they might
be reasonably expected to choose the winner in that district. In particular, we emphasize that no
voting or registration information is used, nor is any demographic information except for what is
dictated by the VRA.
The exact choice of these criteria for our study comes from House Bill 92 (HB92) of the North
Carolina General Assembly, which passed the House during the 2015 legislative session. This bill
proposed establishing a bipartisan commission guided solely by these principles to create redistrict-
ings. Since the companion legislation did not pass the North Carolina Senate, the provision never
became law. In fact, it is just the latest in a chain of bills which have been introduced over the
years with similar criteria and aims.
2.1. Beyond One-Person-One-Vote. There is a large amount of variation in the outcome of an
election depending on the districts used. The simple criteria from HB92 are not enough to produce
a single preferred outcome of the elections. Rather, there is a distribution of possible outcomes. Our
findings in this direction, summarized in Figure 1, clearly show that the results generated by the
redistrictings NC2012 and NC2016 are extremely biased towards the Republicans, while the Judges
redistricting produces acceptably representative results. The NC2012 and NC2016 redistrictings
produce results that are highly atypical of the non-partisan redistrictings we have randomly drawn
according to HB92.
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Figure 1. Probability of a given number of Democratic wins among the 13 congressional
seats using votes from the 2012 election (left) and 2016 election (right).
Over 24,000 random, but reasonable, redistrictings were used to generate the probability dis-
tributions shown in Figure 1. We emphasize that the two plots use the actual votes cast by the
electorate in the 2012 and 2016 Congressional elections, respectively, to determine the outcomes
for each redistricting. For the 2012 vote counts, the NC2012 and NC2016 redistrictings both result
in four Democratic seats, a result that occurs in less than 0.3% of our collection of over 24,000
redistrictings. The Judges redistricting results in the election of six Democrats, which occurs in
over 39% of redistrictings. For the 2016 vote counts, the NC2012 and NC2016 redistrictings results
in three Democratic seats, a result that occurs in less than 0.7% of redistrictings. The Judges
redistricting results in the election of six Democrats, which occurs in 28% of redistrictings.
2.2. Measuring Representativeness and Gerrymandering. While Figure 1 is already quite
compelling, it is useful to develop quantitative measures of how representative the results of a given
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election are. Gerrymandering goes beyond just affecting the results; it also makes districts so safe
that representatives are less responsive to the will of the people, as their legislative choices will
unlikely effect the result of an election. To measure these effects, we propose two indices. The first,
which we call the Gerrymandering Index, is based on the plots used to visualize gerrymandering
introduced in Section 2.3. It quantifies how packed or depleted the collection of districts is relative
to what is expected from the ensemble of “reasonable” redistrictings we have created. The second,
which we call the Representativeness Index, is the measure of how typical the election results
produced by the redistricting are in the context of what is seen in the ensemble of “reasonable”
redistrictings. It is based on the refinement of Figure 1 given in Figure 11 and described in
Section 6.2. Later in Section 2.5, we consider a third index, the Efficiency Gap, which has recently
been employed in the decision Whitford Op. and Order, Dkt. 166, Nov. 21, 2016.
In summary, in this section we consider
• Gerrymandering Index: Measures the degree to which the percentage of Democratic
votes in each district deviates from what is typically seen in our collection of “reasonable”
redistrictings. The squareroot of the sum of the square deviations is the index. Relatively
large scores are less balanced than the bulk of the “reasonable” redistrictings in our ensem-
ble. These large indexed redistrictings typically have some districts with many more voters
from one party than is normally seen or generally have a higher percentage of one party in
many districts than is normal, or both. How the term “normal” is understood is partially
explained in Section 2.3 and completely explained in Section 6.1.
• Representativeness Index: Measures how typical the results obtained by a given redis-
tricting are in the context of the collection of “reasonable” redistrictings we have generated.
Redistrictings with relatively large values produced an election outcome which is farther
from the typical election outcome in the collection of “reasonable” redistrictings. Details
are given in Section 6.2.
Both of these indices are adapted to the geometry of the votes and population density of the state
as reveiled by the ensamble of “reasonable” redistrictings. In this sense, we expect them to be more
nuanced than other metrics which are not informed by the local structure of the state.
As these indices are most useful when values for different redistrictings are compared, we place
each redistricting of interest on the plot of the complementary cumulative distribution function for
each of the three above measures. This allows us to judge the relative size of each index in the
context of our collection of “reasonable” redistrictings.
In a complementary cumulative distribution function, the vertical axis shows the fraction of
random redistrictings which have a larger index value than a redistricting with a given index on the
horizontal axis. We plot results for the Gerrymandering Index and the Representativeness Index in
Figures 2 and 3, respectively. We calculate the probability of each index obtaining a value greater
than a given value based on our random redistrictings. We then situate each of our redistrictings of
interest (NC2012, NC2016, and Judges) on the plot indicating the fraction of random redistrictings
which have a larger index.
Figures 2 and 3, show that the NC2012 and NC2016 redistrictings are quite atypical in both the
Gerrymandering Index and Representative Index, regardless if the votes from 2012 or 2016 are used
in the analysis. None of the over 24,000 reasonable redistrictings constructed had a Gerrymandering
Index bigger than NC2012, regardless whether 2012 or 2016 votes were used. Similarly, none of
the reasonable redistrictings had a Representativeness Index greater than NC2012 when the 2012
votes are used and only 172 (or 0.7%) had a greater Representativeness Index when the 2016
votes are used. Again, none of the reasonable redistrictings had a Gerrymandering Index bigger
than NC2016 under both the 2012 and 2016 votes. Only 34 redistrictings (or 0.14%) and 105
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Figure 2. Gerrymandering Index for the three districts of interest based on the congres-
sional voting data from 2012 (left) and 2016 (right). No generated redistrictings had a
Gerrymandering Index higher than either the NC2012 or the NC2016 redistrictings. The
Judges redistricting plan was less gerrymandered than over 75% of the random districts in
both sets of voting data, meaning that it is an exceptionally non-gerrymandered redistricting
plan.
redistrictings (or 0.43%) had a Representativeness Index greater than NC2016 under the 2012 and
2016 votes, respectively.
In stark contrast, 18,670 redistrictings (or 76.15%) and 18,891 redistrictings (or 77.05%) had
larger Gerrymandering Index than the Judges plan under the 2012 and 2016 votes, respectively. And
7,250 redistrictings (or 29.57%) and 7,625 redistrictings (or 31.1%) had larger Representativeness
Index than the Judges under the 2012 and 2016 votes, respectively.
Our indicies indicate that the Judges plan is a very typical plan. It has a comparatively low
level of gerrymandering and seems to represent the will of the people. The NC2012 and NC2016
are partially unrepresentative and have a high level of gerrymandering in terms of both indices.
2.3. Visualizing Gerrymandering. While the reductive power of a single number can be quite
compelling, we have also developed a simple graphical representation to summarize the properties
of a given redistricting relative to the collection of referenced redistrictings. The goal was to create
a graphical representation which would make visible when a particular redistricting packed or
fractured voters from a particular party to reduce its political power.
One first needs to begin by discovering the natural structure of the geographical distribution of
votes in the state when viewed through the lens of varying over “reasonable” redistrictings. We
begin by ordering the thirteen congressional districts which make up a redistricting from lowest to
highest based on the percentage of Democratic votes in each district. Since there are essentially
only two parties, nothing would change if we instead considered the percentage of Republican votes.
We are interested in the random distribution of this thirteen dimensional vector. Since it is diffi-
cult to visualize such a high dimensional distribution, we summarize the distribution by considering
the marginal distribution of each position in this vector and summarize it in a classical box-plot
for each component of the thirteen dimensional vector in Figure 4. That is to say, we examine
the distribution of votes that make up the percentage of Democratic votes in the most Republican
district. Then we repeat the process for the second most Republican district. Continuing for each
of the rankings, we obtain thirteen box-plots which we arrange horizontally on the same plot.
The box-plots are standard, meaning that within each box-plot the central line gives the median
percentage, while the ends of the box give the location of the upper quartile and the lower quartile
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Figure 3. Representativeness Index for the three districts of interest using congressional
voting data from 2012 (left) and 2016 (right). No redistrictings was less representative than
the NC2012 nor NC2016 redistricting plans. Roughly 30% of redistricting plans were less
representative than the Judges redistricting plan in both sets of voting data, meaning that
the Judges plan was reasonably representative.
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Figure 4. After ordering districts from most Republican to most Democrat, these box-
plots summarize the distribution of the percentage of Democratic votes for the district in
each ranking position for the votes from 2012 (left) and 2016 (right). We compare our
statistical results with the three redistricting plans of interest. The Judges plan seems
to be typical while NC2012 and NC2016 have more Democrats than typical in the most
Democratic districts and fewer in districts which are often switching between Democrat and
Republican, depending on the redistricting.
(25% of the results exist below and above these lines). The outer bracketing line defines an interval
containing either the maximum and minimum values, or three halves the distance of the quantiles
from the mean, whichever is smaller. In the interest of visual clarity, we have not plotted any
outliers. On top of these box-plots, we have overlaid the percentages for the NC2012, NC2016, and
the Judges redistricting. In Figure 5, we also include plots that displays histograms rather than
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box-plots. These plots are richer in detail. Yet, the detail makes it harder to estimate confidence
intervals.
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Figure 5. We present the same data as in Figure 4, but, with histograms replacing the
box-plots. Note that the distribution of the sixth most Republican district (district with
label 6 on the plots) is quite peaked in both the 2012 and 2016 votes, the Judges results are
centered directly on this peak while the NC2012 and NC2016 lie well outside the extent of
the distribution.
The structure of these plots is shaped by the typical structure of the redistrictings in our ensemble
and by extension, the spatial-political structure of the voters in North Carolina. It can then be
used to reveal the structure of our three redistrictings of interest. Observe that for both the 2012
and 2016 votes, the centers of the box-plots form a relatively straight, gradually increasing line
from the most Republican district (labeled 1) to the most Democratic (labeled 13). The Judges
districts mirror this structure. Furthermore, most of the percentages from the Judges districts fall
inside the box on the box-plot which marks the central 50% of the distribution. The NC2012 and
NC2016 have a different structure. There is a large jump between the tenth and eleventh most
Republican district (those with labels 10 and 11, respectively). In the NC2012 redistricting, the
fifth through tenth most Republican districts have more Republicans than one would typically see
in our ensemble of “reasonable” redistrictings. In the NC2016 redistricting, the shifting starts with
the sixth most Republican district and runs through the tenth most Republican district (labeled
6-10). In both cases, the votes removed from the central districts have largely been added to
the three most Democratic districts (labeled 11-13). In the 2012 votes, this moved three to four
districts that typically would have been above the 50% line to below the 50% line, meaning that
these districts elected the Republican rather than the Democrat. With the 2016 votes, the changes
in structure only moved the tenth most Republican district across the 50% line. The geographic
districts associated with these rankings are given in Table 1 from Section 7.2.
Forgetting about the election outcomes, the structure has implications for the competitiveness
of districts and likely political polarization. Rather than a gradual increase at a constant rate from
left to right as the Judges redistricting and the ensemble of box-plots, the NC2012 and NC2016
redistrictings have significantly more Democrats in the three most Democratic districts and fairly
safe Republican majorities in the first eight most Republican districts. There are established
hypotheses that claim safe districts lead to a polarized legislative delegation with fewer centrist
representatives on both sides of the political spectrum.
Figure 4 can be used to motivate and explain the Gerrymandering Index for our redistrictings of
interest. For example, to calculate the Gerrymandering Index for NC2012, one sums the square of
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the distance from the red dots to the mean in each distribution from 1 to 13. The Gerrymandering
Index is the square root of this sum. To aid with visualization, recall that the line though the
center of each box is the median which, in these cases, is close to the mean. Clearly, this index
captures some of the features of Figure 4 discussed in the previous paragraph.
It is remarkable how stable the structures in Figure 4 are across the 2012 and 2016 votes. The
2016 plot is largely a downward shift of the 2012 plot. This stability largely explains why the two
plots in Figure 2 of the Gerrymandering Index look so similar. It also speaks to the stability of
the Representativeness Index in Figure 3. The efficiency gap (introduced in Section 2.5) does not
seem to share this stability as it changes both its values and probabilities in Figure 7 across the
two elections.
2.4. Stability of Election Results. It would be unsettling to think that relatively small changes
in a redistricting would dramatically change the results of an election or the properties of the
redistricting. If this were true, it would call into question the legitimacy of the election results
derived from the redistricting. In particular it might lead one to question the extent to which an
election captures the intent of the votes.
To examine this question, we explored the degree to which the NC2012, NC2016 and Judges
redistrictings are representative of the nearby redistrictings, where we interpret nearby to mean
that roughly 10% of the VTDs are swapped between districts. (See the next paragraph for more
precise description.) By switching nearby VTDs among districts we are able to assess whether small
changes impact the characteristics of the districts or not. We found that the districts within the
NC2012 and NC2016 redistricting plans had a Gerrymandering Index which was significantly larger
than the nearby redistrictings while the Judges plan had a Gerrymandering Index which was in the
middle of the range produced by nearby redistrictings. In other words, switching nearby districts
made the NC2012 and NC 2016 redistrictings less partisan but did not change the characteristics
of the Judges redistricting. This suggests that the NC 2012 and NC2016 redistricting, in contrast
to the Judges redistricting, were precisely engineered and tuned to achieve a partisan goal and that
the components of the NC2012 and NC 2016 redistrictings were not randomly chosen.
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Figure 6. Gerrymandering Index based on random samples drawn from nearby the three
redistrictings of interest: NC2012 (left), NC2016 (center), and Judges (right). Only for the
Judges are the other points in the neighborhood similar to the redistricting of interest. All
plots use the 2012 votes.
More precisely, we randomly sample “reasonable” redistrictings which are near the NC2012,
NC2016, and Judges redistrictings in the sense that no single district differs by more VTDs than
a set threshold from the redistricting understudy. To set the threshold, we observe that among
the over 24,000 redistrictings we generated, the average district size is around 210 VTDs. In a
particular typical redistricting from our ensemble, the sizes roughly varied from 140 to 280 VTDs.
With these numbers in mind, we set our threshold to be 40 VTDs. Since every VTD switched is
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counted twice, once for the district it is leaving and once for the district it is entering, this amounts
to a total of around 10% of the VTDs switching districts.
Figure 6 shows the results of these analyses applied to the NC2012, NC2016, and Judges re-
districtings. The redistrictings sampled around NC2012 have markedly better Gerrymandering
Indices than NC2012 itself. The results are less dramatic for NC2016, but telling nonetheless. This
shows that a randomly chosen redistricting near NC2012 (or respectively NC2016) has very different
properties than NC2012 (or respectively NC2016). This is convincing evidence that the NC2012
and NC2016 redistrictings were deliberately constructed to have unusual properties. It would have
been unlikely to choose such a singularly unusual redistricting by chance. In contrast, the Judges
redistricting has a Gerrymandering Index which is quite typical of its nearby redistrictings. It is
worse than around 50% of those nearby it and hence better than 50% of those nearby it. Thus, it
is very representative of its nearby redistrictings.
2.5. Efficiency Gap and correlation between indices. The Efficiency Gap is a third type of
index that was used in the decision Whitford Op. and Order, Dkt. 166, Nov. 21, 2016. It quantifies
the difference of how many “wasted votes” each party cast; a larger number means that one party
wasted more votes than another. More precisely, the Efficiency Gap is the difference of the wasted
votes for the Democrats and Republicans divided by the number of the total votes in the election
(for both parties). The wasted votes for each party is the sum of the fraction of votes in districts
the party loses plus the sum over the percentage points above 50% in the districts won. 4
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Figure 7. Efficiency gap for the three districts of interest based on the congressional voting
data from 2012 (left) and 2016 (right). No random redistrictings had a greater disparity
in voter efficiency than the NC2012 redistricting plan. Only about 0.3% of the random
redistrictings had a greater disparity in voter efficiency than the NC2016 redistricting in
both sets of voting data. Roughly 60% and 30% of the random redistricting plans had a
greater disparity in voter efficiency than the Judges redistricting plan for the 2012 and 2016
election votes, respectively.
As with the other indices we are most interested in where a particular Efficiency Gap score
sits relative to Efficiency Gap scores of our ensemble of 24,000 generated redistricts. In a graph
completely analogous to the previous plots of complementary cumulative distribution functions,
Figure 7 gives the fraction of the random ensemble with an Efficiency Gap greater than a given
score.
4The original used actual votes, but when the population of each district is equal then the two measures are
exactly equivalent. If the actual votes is close to equal then they are almost the same.
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At first glance, the Efficiency Gap seems to have some similarity with the Gerrymandering
Index. Both try to detect the packing and cracking of a particular political constituency. While
the Efficiency Gap concentrates on the winner of a given district by using a threshold of 50% to
determine what are excess votes, the Gerrymandering Index tries to develop the unique signature
of how a given collection of votes interacts with the geographic distribution of the votes.
To understand how related the Gerrymandering and Representativeness Indices are to each other
and to the Efficiency Gap, we consider the Pearson product-moment correlation coefficient. Using
the voting data of 2012, we find that the correlation between the Gerrymandering Index and the
Representative Index is 0.466, meaning the two indices are moderately correlated. This suggests
that gerrymandered redistrictings tend to be less representative and vice versa. We find that the
Gerrymandering Index and the Efficiency Gap are less positively correlated with a correlation
coefficient of 0.333. On the other hand, the Representative Index and the efficiency gap are more
highly correlated with a correlation coefficient of 0.752. Hence, despite superficial similarity, the
Gerrymandering Index and the Efficiency Gap contain the most distinct information while the
Efficiency Gap and Representative Index are more related. Though we only have two sets of election
data (namely 2012 and 2016), the Gerrymandering and Representativeness Indices complementary
CDF plots are much more stable across elections than the Efficiency Gap appears to be. One can
not conclude much from two examples, but it is suggestive that the Efficiency Gap may be a less
stable index.
2.6. Summary of Main Results. By sampling over 24,000 reasonable redistrictings, we explore
the distribution of different election outcomes by estimating the probabilities of the numbers of
Democrats elected from North Carolina to the U.S. House of Representatives. Our sampling of rea-
sonable redistrictings also allows us to estimate the distribution of winning margins in each district
as well as the value of three indices representing gerrymandering, representativeness, and relative
voter efficiency. In every one of our tests, we have found that the NC2012 and NC2016 redistricting
plans are extraordinarily anomalous, suggesting that (i) these districts are heavily gerrymandered,
(ii) they do not represent the will of the people and (iii) they dilute the votes of one party. We have
also uncovered evidence that these two redistricting plans employ packing and cracking. On the
contrary, the redistricting plan produced by a bipartisan redistricting commission of retired judges
from the Beyond Gerrymandering project produced results which were highly typical among our
24,000 reasonable redistrictings. The Judges plan was exceptionally non-gerrymandered, was a
typical representation of the people’s will, and does not seem to pack or crack either party.
We also explored the degree to which the NC2012, NC2016 and Judges redistrictings were repre-
sentative of the nearby redistrictings, where we interpret nearby to mean that roughly 10% of the
VTDs are switched out of any given district. We found that the NC2012 and NC2016 redistrict-
ings were significantly more gerrymandered than those around them while the Judges redistricting
was similar to those nearby. This seems to imply that the NC2012 and NC2016 redistrictings
were carefully engineered and tuned, and not randomly chosen among those with a certain basic
structure.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In the remainder of this section we describe
the Beyond Gerrymandering project and situate this work in previous reports produced by this
and associated teams. In Section 3, we describe how we construct our distribution of “reasonable”
redistrictings and sample it using Markov chain Monte Carlo, as well as provide some brief historical
context concerning similar efforts. In Section 3.4, we describe how we further sub-select our samples
based on a series of thresholds to better reflect the proposed bipartisan redistricting legislation
HB92. In Section 3.5, we discuss how the parameters of our distribution are chosen to produce
“reasonable” redistrictings. In Section 4 we describe characteristics of our generated “reasonable”
redistrictings. In Section 5, we explore the effect of the Voting Rights Act provision in HB92
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on the outcome of the elections. In Section 6, we give the missing details in the construction of
the Representativeness and Gerrymandering Indices. In Section 7, we show that our results are
insensitive to our choice of parameters. We also provide evidence that our Markov chain Monte
Carlo is running sufficiently long to produce results from the desired distribution. In Section 8,
we provide some details about the data used and some of the more technical choices made in the
preceding analysis. Finally in Section 9, we make some concluding remarks and discuss future
directions. The Appendix of the paper gives some sample maps drawn by our algorithm.
2.7. The Beyond Gerrymandering Project. The Beyond Gerrymandering5 project was a col-
laboration between UNC system President Emeritus and Davidson College President Emeritus
Thomas W. Ross, Common Cause, and the POLIS center at the Sanford School at Duke Univer-
sity. The project’s goal is to educate the public on how an independent, impartial redistricting
process would work. The project formed an independent redistricting commission made up of ten
retired jurists, five Democrat and five Republican. The commission used strong, clear criteria to
create a new North Carolina congressional map based on NC House Bill 92 from the 2015 leg-
islative season. All federal rules related to the Voting Rights Act were followed but no political
data, election results or incumbents addresses were considered when creating new districts. The
commission met twice over the summer of 2016 to deliberate and draw maps. The maps resulting
from this simulated redistricting commission were released in August 2016. The Judges agreed on
a redistricting at the level of Voting Tabulation Districts (VTD). This coarser redistricting was
refined at the level of census blocks to achieve districts with less than 0.1% population deviation.
The original VTD based maps are used in our study.
2.8. Related Works. Ideas to generate redistricting plans with computational algorithms have
been being developed since the 1960’s [18, 22, 10]. There are three main classifications of redis-
tricting algorithms: constructive Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) algorithms [7, 3, 4], moving
boundary MCMC algorithms [15, 16, 1, 24, 9], and optimization algorithms [17, 14]. Constructive
MCMC algorithms begin each new redistricting with an initial random seed and grow districts.
Moving boundary MCMC algorithms find new redistricting plans by altering district boundaries.
In [9], the authors demonstrate that moving boundary MCMC algorithms are better at sampling
the redistricting space than constructive algorithms. It is proven that the former will theoretically
sample the space with the correct probability distribution, where as the latter may construct many
similar redistrictings of one kind while not generating as many equally likely redistricting plans,
leading to a skewed distribution. Optimization algorithms are primarily concerned with generating
one or a collection of ‘elite’ districts, as opposed to sampling the space of all districtings. Recently
an evolutionary algorithm has been proposed which begins with a constructive method, but then
use mixing to find either elite or ‘good enough’ redistrictings [14]; it used the collection of ‘good
enough’ redistrictings to make statistical predictions, however it is still unclear how evolutionary
algorithms compare with Monte Carlo models in terms of sampling the space properly. One advan-
tage of the moving boundary MCMC approach is that we sample form a explicitly specified and
constructed probability distribution on redistrictings. We remark that all of the above works have
considered minimizing population deviation and compactness; a few of the works have considered
minimizing county splitting; none of these works have included Voting Rights Act requirements (see
Section 5 below). We present our algorithm for sampling the space of redistrictings in Section 3,
which is a moving boundary MCMC algorithm.
Once a sampling of the space redistrictings is produced, there are a variety of existing indices
that have been used as a comparison metric for a given districting (see [6] and references therein
for a summary and history of these indices). Such indices include competitiveness, responsiveness,
5 For more information see https://sites.duke.edu/polis/projects/beyond-gerrymandering/
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biasedness, dissimilarity, and efficiency. Similar to our work, the typical idea found in the literature
is to contextualize a given redistricting plan in the context of these indices. Each of these indices
provides a valid method of determining if a given districting plan is typical in the context of
the ensemble of generated redistrictings. None of these previous indices, however, account for
the underlying geography of a given state. As pointed out in [3], maps may naturally be less
competitive simply based on geography rather than partisan tampering. The gerrymandering and
representative indices we have introduced in this work are the first, to our knowledge, that account
for the geography of a given state; in particular, the Gerrymandering Index gives the first metric of
how gerrymandered a given redistricting plan is, in the context of drawing plans without partisan
data. This coupling of indices may provide a more robust metric. We have seen some preliminary
evidence of this in Sections 2.5 and 2.2, however more study is required to test this hypothesis.
2.9. Evolution of This Project. This work originated as a PRUV project and subsequent senior
thesis of Christy Vaughn (now Christy Vaughn Graves), both of which were supervised by Jonathan
Mattingly during the summer of 2013 and the academic year 2013-2014. This initial phase of the
project concentrated on North Carolina and was summarized in the technical report “Redistricting
and the Will of the People.” (See [16] from references.)
That work grew into a summer undergraduate research project as part of the Data+ program
in the Information Initiative at Duke6 during the summer of 2015. This work analyzed a number
of different states and introduced VRA and county fragmentation considerations. The research
team consisted of Duke undergraduates Christy Vaughn Graves, Sachet Bangia, Bridget Dou, and
Sophie Guo and was again mentored by Jonathan Mattingly. The work is summarized at the online
resource “Quantifying Gerrymandering” (See [1] from references.).
During the summer of 2016, a second Data+ team was formed with the intention of analyzing the
redistrictings produced by the judges in the Beyond Gerrymandering project. (See Section 2.7 from
references.). The Summer 2016 Data+ team consisted of Duke undergraduates Hansung Kang and
Justin Luo, graduate mentor Robert Ravier, post-doc mentor Greg Herschlag, and faculty mentor
Jonathan Mattingly.
This report is based on the new code base developed by the Summer 2016 Data+ team. It uses
a refined formulation that builds on the work of the previous teams. Christy Vaughn Graves and
Sachet Bangia provided important continuity between the years. The 2016 Data+ team developed
new analytic tools, some based on the useful visualizations provided by the box-plots developed by
the summer 2015 Data+ team. Some of the text and arguments from the 2014 report have been
integrated into this new report.
3. Random Sampling of Reasonable Redistrictings
Central to our analysis is the ability to generate a large number of different “reasonable” re-
districtings. This is accomplished by sampling a probability distribution on possible redistrictings
of North Carolina. The distribution is constructed so that it is concentrated on “reasonable” re-
districtings. We then filter the randomly drawn redistrictings, using only those which satisfy our
criteria for being “reasonable.”
As already mentioned, we take our definition of “reasonable” redistrictings from the unratified
House Bill 92 (HB92) from the 2015 Session of the North Carolina General Assembly 7 which stated
that a bipartisan commission should draw up redistrictings while observing the following principles:
• §120-4.52(f): Districts must be contiguous; areas that meet only at points are not considered
to be contiguous.
6see http://bigdata.duke.edu/data
7Nonpartisan Redistricting Commission. House Bill 92. General Assembly of North Carolina Session 2015. House
DRH10039-ST-12 (02/05)
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• §120-4.52(c): Districts should have close to equal populations, with deviations from the
ideal population division within 0.1%.
• §120-4.52(g): Districts should be reasonably compact, with (1) the maximum length and
width of any given district being as close to equal as possible and (2) the total perimeter
of all districts being as small as possible.
• §120-4.52(e): Counties will be split as infrequently as possible and into as few districts as
possible. The division of Voting Tabulation Districts (VTDs) will also be minimized.
• §120-4.52(d): Redistrictings should comply with pre-existing federal and North Carolina
state law, such as the Voting Rights Act (VRA) of 1965.
• §120-4.52(h): Districts shall not be drawn with the use of (1) political affiliations of reg-
istered voters, (2) previous election results, or (3) demographic information other than
population. An exception may be made only when adhering to federal law (such as the
VRA).
We restrict our probability distribution to redistrictings which have connected districts. The re-
maining principles are encoded in a score function which is minimized by redistrictings that are
most successful at satisfying the remaining design principles. We introduce some mathematical
formalisms in order to describe the score function.
We represent the state of North Carolina as a graph G with edges E and vertices V . Each vertex
represents a Voting Tabulation District (VTD) and an edge between two vertices exists if the two
VTDs are adjacent on the map. This graph representing the North Carolina voting landscape has
over 2500 vertices and over 8000 edges.
Since North Carolina has thirteen seats in the U.S. House of Representatives, we define a redis-
tricting plan to be a function from the set of vertices to the integers between one and thirteen. More
formally, recalling that V was the set of vertices, we represent a redistricting plan by a function
ξ : V → {1, 2, . . . , 13}. If a VTD is represented by a vertex v ∈ V, then ξ(v) = i means that
the VTD in question belongs to district i. Similarly for i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , 13} and a plan ξ, the i-th
district, which we denote by Di(ξ), is given by the set {v ∈ V : ξ(v) = i}. We wish to only consider
redistricting plans ξ such that each district Di(ξ) is a single connected component. We will denote
the collection of all redistricting plans with connected districts by R.
3.1. The Score Function. We now wish to define a function J that assigns a nonnegative number
J(ξ) to every redistricting ξ ∈ R. To do this, we employ functions Jp, JI , Jc, and Jm that measure
how well a given redistricting satisfies the individual principles outlined in HB92. The population
score Jp(ξ) measures how well the redistricting ξ partitions the population of North Carolina into 13
equal parts. The isoperimetric score JI(ξ) measures how compact the districts are by returning the
sum of the isoperimetric constants for each district, a quantity which is minimized by a circle. The
county score Jc(ξ) measures the number of counties split between multiple districts; the minimum
is achieved when there are no split counties. Lastly, the minority score Jm(ξ) measures the extent
to which the districts with the largest percentage of African-Americans achieve stipulated target
percentages. With these, we then define our score function J to be a weighted sum of Jp, JI , Jc,
and Jm; we use a weighted combination so as to not give one of the above scores undue influence,
since all of the score functions do not necessarily change on the same scale. Specifically, we define:
J(ξ) = wpJp(ξ) + wIJI(ξ) + wcJc(ξ) + wmJm(ξ),(1)
where wp, wI , wc, and wm are a collection of positive weights.
To describe the individual score functions, we attach to our graph G = (V,E) some data which
gives relevant features of each VTD. We define the positive functions pop(v), area(v), and AA(v)
for a vertex v ∈ V as respectively the total population, geographic area, and African-American
population of the VTD associated with the vertex v. We extend these functions to a collection of
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vertices B ⊂ V by
pop(B) =
∑
v∈B
pop(v), area(B) =
∑
v∈B
area(v), AA(B) =
∑
v∈B
AA(v) .(2)
We think of the boundary of a district Di(ξ) as the subset of the edges E which connect vertices
inside of Di(ξ) to vertices outside of Di(ξ). We write D. i(ξ) for the boundary of the district Di(ξ).
Since we want to include the exterior boundary of each district (the section bordering an adjacent
state or the ocean), we add to V the vertex o which represents the “outside” and connect it with an
edge to each vertex representing a VTD which is on the boundary of the state. We always assume
that any redistricting ξ always satisfies ξ(v) = 0 if and only if v = o. Since ξ always satisfies
ξ(o) = 0 and hence o 6∈ Di(ξ) for i ≥ 1, it does not matter that we have not defined area(o) or
pop(o), as o is never included in the districts.
Given an edge e ∈ E which connects the two vertices v, v˜ ∈ V , we define boundary(e) to be the
length of common border of the VTDs associated with the vertex v and v˜. As before, we extend
the definition to the boundary of a set of edges B ⊂ E by
boundary(B) =
∑
e∈B
boundary(e) .(3)
With these preliminaries out of the way, we turn to defining the first three score functions used
to assess the goodness of a redistricting.
3.1.1. The population score function. We define the population score by
Jp(ξ) =
√√√√ 13∑
i=1
(pop(Di(ξ))
popIdeal
− 1
)2
, popIdeal =
Npop
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where Npop is the total population of North Carolina, pop(Di(ξ)) is the population of the district
Di(ξ) as defined in (2), and popIdeal is the population that each district should have according to
the ‘one person one vote’ standard; namely, popIdeal is equal to one-thirteenth of the total state
population.
3.1.2. The Isoperimetric score function. The Isoperimetric score JI , which measures the compact-
ness of a district, is the ratio of the perimeter to the total area of each district. The Isoperimetric
score is minimized for a circle, which is the most compact shape. Hence we define
JI(ξ) =
13∑
i=1
[
boundary(D. i(ξ))
]2
area(Di(ξ))
.
where D. i(ξ) is the set of edges which define the boundary, boundary(D. i(ξ)) is the length of the
boundary of district Di and area(Di(ξ)) is its area.
This compactness measure is one of two measures often used in the legal literature where it is
referred to as the perimeter score (See [20, 21] from references). The second measure, usually re-
ferred to as the dispersion score, is more sensitive to overly elongated districts, though the perimeter
score also penalizes them. The dispersion score does not penalize undulating boundaries while the
perimeter score (our JI) does.
3.1.3. The county score function. The county score function Jc(ξ) penalizes redistrictings which
contain single counties contained in two or more districts. We refer to these counties as split
counties. The score consists of the number of counties split over two different districts times a
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factor W2(ξ) plus a large constant MC times the number of counties split over three of more
different districts times a second factor W3(ξ). Specifically, we define:
Jc(ξ) ={# counties split between 2 districts} ·W2(ξ)
+MC · {# counties split between ≥ 3 districts} ·W3(ξ)
where MC is a large constant and the weights W2(ξ) and W3(ξ) are defined by
W2(ξ) =
∑
counties
split between
2 districts
(
Fraction of county VTDs in 2nd largest
intersection of a district with the county
) 1
2
W3(ξ) =
∑
counties
split between
≥ 3 districts
(
Fraction of county VTDs not in 1st or 2nd
largest intersection of a district with the county
) 1
2
The factors W2(ξ) and W3(ξ) make the score function vary in a more continuous fashion, which
encourages reduction of the smaller fraction of a split county.
3.1.4. The Voting Rights Act or minority score function. It is less clear what it means for a redis-
tricting to comply with the VRA. African-American voters make up approximately 20% of the eli-
gible voters in North Carolina. Since 0.2 is between 213 and
3
13 , the current judicial interpretation of
the VRA stipulates that at least two districts should have enough African-American representation
so that this demographic may elect a candidate of their choice. However, the NC2012 redistricting
plan was ruled unconstitutional because two districts, each containing over 50% African-Americans,
were ruled to have been packed too heavily with African-Americans, diluting their influence in
other districts. The NC2016 redistricting was accepted based on racial considerations of the VRA
and contained districts that held 44.48% African-Americans, and 36.20% African-Americans. The
amount of deviation constitutionally allowed from these numbers is unclear.
Based on these considerations, we chose a VRA score function which awards lower scores to
redistrictings which had one district with at least 44.48% African-Americans and a second district
with at least 36.20% African-Americans. We write
Jm(ξ) =
√
H(44.48%−m1) +
√
H(36.20%−m2),(4)
where m1 and m2 represent the percentage of African-Americans in the districts with the highest
and second highest percent of African-Americans, respectively. H is the function defined by H(x) =
0 for x ≤ 0 and H(x) = x for x ≥ 0. We chose this function to make the transition smoother,
and we utilize the square root function to encourage districts that are just above the threshold to
be less probable than when no square root is included. Notice that whenever m1 ≥ 44.84% and
m2 ≥ 36.20% we have that Jm = 0.
3.2. The Probability Distributions on Redistrictings. We now use the score function J(ξ)
to assign a probability to each redistricting ξ ∈ R that makes redistrictings with lower scores more
likely. Fixing a β > 0, we define the probability of ξ, denoted by Pβ(ξ), by
Pβ(ξ) = e
−βJ(ξ)
Zβ(5)
where Zβ is the normalization constant defined so that Pβ(R) = 1. Specifically,
Zβ =
∑
ξ∈R
e−βJ(ξ) .
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The positive constant β is often called the “inverse temperature” in analogy with statistical me-
chanics and gas dynamics. When β is very small (the high temperature regime), different elements
of R have close to equal probability. As β increases (“the temperature decreases”), the measure
concentrates the probability around the redistrictings ξ ∈ R which minimize J(ξ).
3.3. Generating Random Redistrictings. If we neglect the fact that the individual districts
in a redistricting need to be connected, then there are more than 132500 ≈ 7.2 × 102784 different
redistrictings, larger than both the current estimate for the number of atoms in the universe (be-
tween 1078 and 1082) and the estimated number of seconds since the Big Bang (4.3× 1017). While
there are significantly fewer redistrictings in R (the set of simply connected redistrictings), it is
not practical to enumerate all redistrictings to find those with the lowest values of J (i.e. the most
probable ones).
The standard, very effective way to escape this curse of dimensionality is to use a Markov chain
Monte Carlo (MCMC) algorithm to sample from the probability distribution Pβ. The basic idea is
to define a random walk on R which has Pβ as its unique, attracting stationary measure. We do
this using the standard Metropolis-Hastings algorithm.
The Metropolis-Hastings algorithm is designed to use one Markov transition kernel Q (the pro-
posal chain) to sample from another Markov transition kernel that has a unique stationary distri-
bution µ (the target distribution). Q(ξ, ξ′) gives the probability of moving from the redistricting ξ
to the redistricting ξ′ in the proposal Markov chain and is readily computable. We use Q to draw
a sample distributed according to µ. The algorithm proceeds as follows:
(1) Choose some initial state ξ ∈ R.
(2) Propose a new state ξ′ with transition probabilities given by Q(ξ, ξ′).
(3) Accept the proposed state with probability p = min
(
1, µ(ξ
′)q(ξ′,ξ)
µ(ξ)Q(ξ,ξ′)
)
.
(4) Repeat steps 2 and 3.
The stationary distribution of this Markov chain matches the stationary measure µ. Thus, the
states can be treated as samples from the desired distribution. The stationary measure we would
like to sample is Pβ. We sample from three possible initial states: the NC2012, the NC2016,
and the Judges redistricting. Since this algorithm is designed to converge to a unique stationary
measure Pβ, any results should be independent of the initial starting point. However, this assumes
the parameters have been chosen so that the time to equilibrate is short enough to happen during
our runs.8 We show that the results are independent of the initial condition in Section 7.3, which
lends credence to the assertion that the algorithm is equilibrating.9
We define the proposal chain Q used for proposing new redistrictings in the following way:
(1) Uniformly pick a conflicted edge at random. An edge, e = (u, v) is a conflicted edge if
ξ(u) 6= ξ(v), ξ(u) 6= 0, ξ(v) 6= 0.
(2) For the chosen edge e = (u, v), with probability 12 , either:
ξ′(w) =
{
ξ(w) w 6= u
ξ(v) u
or ξ′(w) =
{
ξ(w) w 6= v
ξ(u) v
8Though technical, one can rigorously prove that the Markov Chain given by this algorithm converges to the
desired distribution if run long enough. One only needs to establish that the Markov Chain transition matrix is
irreducible and aperiodic. Since one can evolve from any connection redistricting to another through steps of the
chain, it is irreducible. Aperiodicity follows as there exist redistrictings which are connect to itself through a loop
consisting of two steps and a loop consisting of three steps. Since 2 and 3 are prime and hence have greatest common
divisor 1, the chain is aperiodic. See the Perron-Frobenius Theorem for more details.
9As this work was being completed an the work in [5] appeared which provides an interesting set of ideas to assess
if samples being drawn are typical or outliers exactly in our context. We hope to explore these ideas in the near
future.
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Let conflicted(ξ) be the number of conflicted edges for redistricting ξ. Then we have Q(ξ, ξ′) =
1
2
1
conflicted(ξ) . The acceptance probability is given by:
p = min
(
1,
conflicted(ξ)
conflicted(ξ′)
e−β(J(ξ
′)−J(ξ))
)
If a redistricting ξ′ is not connected, then we refuse the step, which is equivalent to setting J(ξ′) =
∞.
Given a fixed set of weights (wp, wi, wc, wm), one still needs to determine an appropriate β so that
typical samples from the distribution are “reasonable” redistrictings. If β is chosen to be too large,
the algorithm will seek out a local minimum and leave this minimum with very low probability,
meaning that it may require a large amount of steps to switch between high quality redistrictings.
If β is chosen to be too low, then the algorithm will never find the locally good districts as it will
choose redistrictings indiscriminately.
There are several well established ideas in the literature to overcome these challenges, including
simulated annealing (e.g. [23]), parallel tempering (e.g. [11]) and simulated tempering (e.g. [9]).
In the present work, we examine simulated annealing, in which β is set to be small at first until a
certain number of steps are accepted (in the sense of step (3) from the algorithm in Section 3.3).
This allows the system to explore the space of redistrictings more freely. Next, β is increased
linearly to a maximum value over the course of a defined number of steps. This slowly “cools” the
systems, hopefully relaxing it into a redistricting ξ which has a relatively low score J(ξ). Finally,
β is kept at this fixed maximum value for a defined number of steps so that the algorithm locally
samples the measure Pβ sufficiently long enough to produce a good redistricting. During the
summer of 2016 Data+ Project, we explored extensively the use of parallel tempering to generate
Monte Carlo sampled. We found that simulated annealing more reliably explored the state space.
Parallell tempering does have the advantage of always sampling from the same target distribution
while simulated annealing changes the target distribution to improve mixing. In theory parallell
tempering should also behave well, tough we found tuning it properly more difficult.
The principal results quoted in Section 2 use the low β to be zero over 40, 000 steps, linearly
increase β to one over 60, 000 steps, and fix β to be one for 20, 000 steps before taking a sample.
This process is repeated for each sample redistricting. One potential critique with using simulated
annealing is that the results may depend on the number of steps chosen above. We make a standard
test to confirm that we have taken an appropriate number of steps by doubling each number of
steps and repeating our analysis. The results of this test, which are found in Section 7.3, show that
doubling the number of steps has little effect on the results.
3.4. Thresholding the sampled redistrictings. It is possible for the simulated annealing algo-
rithm to draw a redistricting with a bad score when using the MCMC algorithm from Section 3.3
combined with the probability distribution given in (5). Additionally, the use of simulated anneal-
ing also increases the chance that we become stuck in a local minimum with a less than desirable
score function, as such local minimum may take longer than the time we spend at high β to escape.
These local trapping events can often lead to samples with less than perfect score functions. Lastly,
our score functions do not perfectly encapsulate our redistricting design aesthetic. For example,
since the isoperimetric score function is the sum of the individual isoperimetric scores of each dis-
trict, it is still possible to have one bad district if the rest have exceptionally small isoperimetric
scores.
Since we want to maximize the degree of compliance with HB92, we only use samples which
pass an additional set of thresholds, one for each of the selection criteria. This additional layer
of rejection sampling was also used in reference [9], though the authors of reference [9] chose to
reweigh the samples to produce the uniform distribution over the set redistrictings that satisfy the
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thresholds. We prefer to continue to bias our sampling according to the score function so better
redistrictings are given higher weights; we note that the idea of preferring some redistrictings to
others is consistent with the provisions HB92. We now detail our thresholding requirements.
It is our experience from the Beyond Gerrymandering project that redistrictings which use VTDs
as their building blocks and have less that 1% population deviation can readily be driven to 0.1%
population deviation by breaking the VTDs into census tracts and performing minimal alterations
to the overall redistricting plan. We thus only accept redistrictings that have no districts above
1% population deviation. Many of our samples have deviations considerably below this value. It
is important to emphasize that we require this of every district in the redistricting. In Section 7.1,
we show that the results are quantitatively extremely similar, and qualitatively identical, when the
population threshold is decreased from 1% to 0.75 % and then to 0.5%.
We have found that districts with isoperimetric scores under 60 are almost always reasonably
compact. Thus, we choose to accept a redistricting only if each district in the plan has an isoperi-
metric ratio less than 60. The Judges redistricting plan would be accepted under this threshold as
its least compact district has an isoperimetric score of 53.5. Neither NC2012 nor NC2016 would be
accepted with this thresholding as the least compact districts of each plan have isoperimetric scores
of 434.65 and 80.1, respectively. We also note that only two of the thirteen districts for the NC2012
plan meet our isoperimetric score threshold, whereas eight of the thirteen districts of NC2016 fall
below the threshold. Although we examine our principle results over a space of highly compact
redistricting plans, we also demonstrate that our results are insensitive to lifting this restriction in
Section 7.1.
Though redistrictings which split a single county in three are infrequent, they do occur among
our samples. Since these are undesirable, we only accept redistrictings for which no counties
are split across three or more districts. Note that, in order to satisfy population requirements,
we must allow counties to be split into two districts because of the large populations of Wake
and Mecklenburg Counties which each contain a population larger than a single Congressional
district’s ideal population. We do not explicitly threshold based on number of split counties, though
redistrictings with more split counties have a higher scores, and hence are less favored. We remark
that none of our generated redistrictings had more county splits than the NC2012 redistricting
plan, and that the NC2012 plan was never critiqued or challenged based on the number of county
splits.
To build a threshold based on minority requirements of the VRA, we note that the NC2016
redistricting was deemed by the courts to satisfy the VRA. The districts in this plan with the two
highest proportion of African-Americans to total population are composed of 44.5% and 36.2%
African-Americans. With this in mind, we only accept redistrictings if the districts with the two
highest percentages of African-American population have at least 40% and 33.5%, respectively.
The effect of all of these thresholds was to select around 16% of the samples initially produced
by our MCMC runs. Though this leads to unused samples, it ensures that all of the redistrictings
used meet certain minimal standards. This in turn allowed us to better adhere to the spirit of
HB92. The reported 24,000 samples used in our study refer to those left after thresholding. The
full data set of samples was in excess of 150,000. That being said, we show in Section 7.1 that
results without thresholding were quantitatively very close and qualitatively identical. As already
mentioned, we also show that decreasing the population threshold from 1% to 0.75% and then to
0.5% also has little effect on the quantitative results and no effect on the qualitative conclusions.
3.5. Determining the weight parameters. As we have mentioned above, we have four indepen-
dent weights (wp, wI , wc, wm) used in balancing the effect of the different scores in the total score
J(ξ). In addition to these parameters, we also have the low and high temperatures corresponding
respectively to the max and min β used in the simulated annealing. We set the minimum value of β
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to be zero which corresponds to infinite temperature. In this regime, no district is favored over any
other, which allows the redistricting plan freedom to explore the space of possible redistrictings.
The only parameter left is to set the high value of β. Since β multiplies the weights, one of these
degrees of freedom is redundant and can be set arbitrarily. We chose to fix the low temperature
(high value of β) to be one.
To select appropriate parameters, we employ the following tuning method:
(1) Set all weights to zero.
(2) Find the smallest wp such that a fraction of the results are within a desired threshold
(for the current work we ensured that at least 25% of the redistrictings were below 0.5%
population deviation, however we typically did much better than this).
(3) Using the wp from the previous step, find the smallest wI such that a fraction of the
redistrictings have all districts below a given isoperimetric ratio (we ensured that at least
10% of the results were below this threshold; we chose a threshold of 60 (see Section 3.4)).
(4) If above criteria for population is no longer met, repeat steps 2 through 4 until both con-
ditions are satisfied
(5) Using the wp and wI from the previous steps, find the smallest wm such that at least 50%
of all redistrictings have at least one district with more than 40% African-Americans and a
second district has at least 33.5% African-Americans.
(6) If the thresholds for population were overwhelmed by increasing wm, repeat steps 2 through
6. If the thresholds for compactness were overwhelmed, repeat steps 3 through 6.
(7) Using the wp, wI , and wm from the previous steps, find the smallest wc such that we nearly
always only have two county splits, and the number of two county splits are, on average,
below 25 two county splits.
(8) If the thresholds for population are no longer satisfied, repeat steps 2 through 8. If the
criteria for the compactness is no longer met, repeat steps 3 through 8. If the criteria for
the minority populations is not satisfied, repeat steps 5 through 8. Otherwise, finish with
a good set of parameters.
With this process, we settle on parameters wp = 3000, wI = 2.5, wc = 0.4, and wm = 800 and
have used these parameters for all of the results presented in the main results above (Section 2).
In Section 7.5, we show that variations of these choices have little qualitative effect on the results.
4. Characteristics of “reasonable” redistrictings ensamble
We now explore the properties of the over 24,000 random restrictings we have generated using the
algorithm described in the preceding sections. All of the random redistrictings passed the threshold
test described in Section 3.4. As such, they all have no district with population deviation above
1%. However, most have a deviation much less than 1%: the mean population deviation taken over
the more-than 13×24000 = 312, 000 districts is 0.16% with a standard deviation of 0.14%. Figure 8
gives a finer view for the distribution of the population deviation. We order each redistricting by
the maximum population deviation over all districts. To simultaneously give a sense of the median
population deviation of the districts with a given maximum population deviation, we examine the
local statistics of the ordered districts to find the maximum and minimum values of the local median
(plotted as the blue envelope) along with the standard deviation of the median (green envelop) and
expected value of the median (dotted line). With this plot we notice that over 50% of redistrictings
have a worst case population deviation under 0.4% and many of these redistrictings have a median
population deviation well below 0.2%.
To compare the population deviation of our generated districts with the districtings of NC2012,
NC2016 and the Judges, we note that all of these districtings all had to split VTDs in order to
achieve a population deviation below 0.1%. Before splitting VTDs, NC2012, NC2016 and Judges
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had a district with maximum population deviation of 0.847%, 0.683%, and 0.313% respectively,
and had median population deviations of 0.234%, 0.048%, and 0.078% respectively, meaning that
the districts sampled by our algorithm are very similar to the three districts we have compared our
results with in terms of population deviation.
Turing to the isoperimetric ratios, recall that all of the districts have an isoperimetric constant
under 60 as that was our threshold value. The mean isoperimetric ratio of the more-than 13 ×
24000 = 312, 000 districts is 36.9 with a standard deviation of 9. Examining the second part of
Figure 8 gives an analogously finer view for the distribution of the isoperimetric ratios of all districts.
The figure shows that most redistrictings have a median isoperimetric ratio in the mid-thirties and
that roughly 50% of our redistrictings have a district with isoperimetric ratio no worse than 55 for
an isoperimetric ratio.
When comparing our generated districts, we note that the NC2012, NC2016 and Judges redis-
trictings have districts with maximum isoperimetric ratio of 434.6, 80.1, and 54.1 respectively, and
have median isoperimetric ratios of 114.4, 54.5, and 38.2 respectively. The NC2012 and NC2016
districts would be rejected under our thresholding criteria. Below, we demonstrate that sampling
from redistrictings that include less compact districts does not change our results (see section 7).
Figure 8. The redistrictings ordered by the worst case district in terms of either popu-
lation deviation (left) or isoperimetric ratio (right). The solid dark line give the worst case
districts value while the dotted line gives the average across redistricting with a given max
value of median districts value. The outer shading gives the max and min value of this
median while the inner-shading covers one standard deviation above and below the mean of
the medians.
Next we examine the four districts with the highest minority representation in each districting.
In Figure 9, we order the redistrictings in decreasing order on the over 24000 accepted redistrictings.
The kink in this line at 44.46% occurs due to the minority energy function which does not favor
any population above this limit (recall this number was based on NC2016). Roughly half of the
redistrictings have a district with greater than 44.46% of the population as African-Americans,
whereas the other half has between 40% and 44.46% in the district with the largest number of
African-Americans. For the district with the second highest African-American representation, we
remark that over 80% of all redistrictings have more than 35% African-American representation in
the second largest district; there is not a single redistricting that has the second largest African-
American district with more than 40% of the population African-American.
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Finally we display the histogram of the number of split counties over our generated redistrictings.
We find a median of 21 split counties with a mean of 21.6, and a range from 14 to 31. We remark
that NC2012, NC2016, and Judges districtings had 40, 13, and 12 split counties respectively.
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Figure 9. The redistrictings are ordered by the district with the largest African-American
percentage (left). Subsequent ranges show standard deviations for districts with the second
and third largest African-American representation. We plot the histogram of the number of
county splits in each districting (right). The lighter histogram gives the number total split
counties while the darker histogram gives only the number which splits the county into two
parts each containing more than 10% of the total VTDs.
5. The effect of the Voting Rights Act
The NC2012 districts were labeled unconstitutional for over packing African-Americans and
diluting their voice in other districts. We investigate the effect of the Voting Rights Act (VRA) on
election outcomes by considering samples taken from simulations that do not take the VRA into
account, which is to say that we set wm = 0. We examine the distribution of elected Democrats
along with the histogram box-plots in Figure 10. We find that the VRA, even with the more
modest thresholds of 40% and 33% required African-Americans, significantly favors the Republican
party. Without the VRA, there is roughly a 65% chance that 7 or more Democrats will be elected,
with a 20% chance that 8 Democrats will be elected; in contrast, with the VRA considered, there
is a 50% chance that 7 or more Democrats are elected, with a 10% chance that 8 Democrats are
elected. Without commenting specifically on the VRA, we point out that these results highlight the
importance of §120-4.52(h) in HB92, as they demonstrate that districts drawn with demographic
information in mind can significantly alter the likely outcome of an election.
6. Details of the Indices
We begin by expounding and clarifying how we compute the Gerrymandering Index and the
Representativeness Index. We have thoroughly explained the efficiency gap above so omit further
discussion in the current section.
6.1. Details of Gerrymandering Index. To compute the Gerrymandering Index, we examine
the mean percentage of Democratic votes in each of the thirteen districts when the districts are
ordered from most to least Republican (see Figure 4). To calculate the Gerrymandering Index for
any given redistricting plan, we take the Democratic votes for each district when the districts are
again ordered from most to least Republican. The differences between the mean and the observed
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Figure 10. We display changes of the distribution of election results when the VRA is
not taken into consideration (left). The histogram formed from the distribution of our main
results overlays this image with the gray shaded histogram. We display changes to the
histogram of the box-plot when comparing the results when VRA is considered or not (right).
democratic percentage are taken for each district using a given set of votes. These differences are
then each squared and summed over the 13 districts. The square root of this sum of squares is our
Gerrymandering Index.
The Gerrymandering Index is smallest when all of the ordered Democratic vote percentages are
precisely the mean values. However, this is likely not possible as the percentages in the different
districts are highly correlated. To understand the range of possible values, we plot the complemen-
tary cumulative distribution function of the Gerrymandering Index of our ensemble of randomly
generated reasonable redistrictings (see Figure 2). This gives a context in which to interpret any
one score.
The mean percentages for the collection of redistricting we generated is
(0.37, 0.39, 0.41, 0.44, 0.46, 0.48, 0.50, 0.52, 0.55, 0.57, 0.60, 0.63, 0.67) .
If a given redistricting is associated with the sorted winning Democratic percentages
(0.36, 0.38, 0.39, 0.40, 0.41, 0.42, 0.43, 0.44, 0.49, 0.52, 0.64, 0.66, 0.7) .
then the Gerrymandering Index for the redistricting is the square root of
(0.37− 0.36)2 + (0.39− 0.38)2 + (0.41− 0.39)2
+ (0.44− 0.40)2 + (0.46− 0.41)2 + (0.48− 0.42)2 + (0.50− 0.43)2
+ (0.52− 0.44)2 + (0.55− 0.49)2 + (0.57− 0.52)2 + (0.60− 0.64)2
+ (0.63− 0.66)2 + (0.67− 0.7)2 = 0.0291
In summary, in this example the Gerrymandering Index is
√
0.0291 = 0.17.
6.2. Details of Representativeness Index. To calculate the Representativeness Index, we first
construct a modified histogram of election results that captures how close an election was to swap-
ping results. To do this for a given redistricting plan, we examine the least Republican district in
which a Republican won, and the least Democratic district in which a Democrat won. We then
linearly interpolate between these districts and find where the interpolated line intersects with the
50% line. For example, in the 2012 election, the 9th most Republican district elected a Republican
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with 53.3% of the vote, and the fourth most Democratic district won their district with 50.1% of
the vote. We would then calculate where these two vote counts cross the 50% line, which will be
50− (100− 50.1)
53.3− (100− 50.1) ≈ 0.03,(6)
and add this to the number of Democratic seats won to arrive at the continuous value of 4.03.
This index allows us to construct a continuous variable that contains information on the number
of Democrats elected, and also demonstrates how much safety there is in the victory.
Fractional parts close to zero suggest that the most competitive Democratic race is less likely to
go Democratic than the most competitive Republican race is to go Republican. On the other hand,
fractional parts close to one suggest that the most competitive Republican race is less likely to
go Republican than the most competitive Democratic race is to go Democratic. Instead of simply
creating a histogram of the number of seats won by the Democrats, in Figure 11 we construct a
histogram of our new interpolated value. We define the representativeness as the distance from
the interpolated value to the mean value of this histogram (shown in the dashed line). These are
the values we report in Figure 3. For the 2012 vote data, we find that the mean interpolated
Democratic seats won is 7.01, and the Judges plan yields a value of 6.28, giving a Representative
Index of |7.01 − 6.28| = 0.73. The NC2012 and NC2016 plans both have representative indices
greater than two.
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Figure 11. For the 2012 votes (left) and the 2016 votes (right), we plot the interpolated
winning margins, which give the number of seats won by the Democrats in finer detail.
We determine the mean of this new histogram and display it with the dashed line. The
Representativeness Index is defined to be the distance from this mean value. The histogram
presented in Figure 1 is overlaid on this plot for reference.
7. Testing the Sensitivity of Results
We wish to ensure that our algorithm has sampled the space of redistrictings in a robust way.
We use this section to carefully study the effect of changing the number of samples used, changing
the set of threshold values, changing the weights in our distribution, changing the type of energy
function used for compactness, changing simulated annealing parameters on election results, and
determining the possible effect of splitting VTDs to achieve zero population deviation. We also
verify that the choice of the initial district does not influence our results and that this information
is lost as the algorithm updates the redistrictings.
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7.1. Varying thresholds. Achieving a 0.1% population deviation is the only statute of HB92 that
we violate. Although we have noted above that the Judges original redistrictings in the ‘Beyond
Gerrymandering’ project were all slightly over 1% population deviation, and splitting VTDs to fall
below this threshold had little impact on the election results. We test this for our own redistrictings
by changing the population threshold to 0.75% and 0.5%. The results are shown in Figure 12, for
which we have used the 2012 vote data. We find that tightening the population threshold has
negligible impact on the number of Democrats elected, and that the variation in the histogram
box-plots is barely perceptible. In the 0.5% population deviation threshold plots, we have discarded
over half of our results and we still do not see any significant changes. These results support our
claim that splitting VTDs to achieve a less than 0.1% deviation will have a negligible effect on our
conclusions.
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Figure 12. We display changes of the distribution of election results with changes to the
population threshold (left). The histogram formed with 1% population deviation overlays
this image with the gray shaded histogram. We display changes to the histogram of the
box-plot when comparing 1% population deviation threshold with 0.5% (right).
Next, we note that there is no corresponding law to dicate a choice of compactness threshold.
The NC2016 districts have a maximum isoperimetric ratio of around 80, and the NC2012 districts
have a maximum of over 400. The Judges redistricting has a district with maximum isoperimetric
ratio of around 54. To test the effect of setting different compactness thresholds, we repeat our
analysis by choosing 54, 80 and no threshold for the maximum isoperimetric ratio of all districts
within a redistricting. We find that relaxing the compactness threshold minimally changes the
election results as demonstrated in Figure 13. We note that having no threshold does not mean
that we have arbitrarily large compactness values. This is because of the cooling process in the
simulated annealing algorithm and the fact that we continue to penalize large compactness scores.
We find that we have an average maximum isoperimetric ratio of around 75 and that we rarely see
redistrictings with maximal ratio larger than 120.
7.2. Sample Maps, Details of Districts and Raw Data. Table 1 gives the percentage of
Democratic votes in NC2012, NC 2016, and the Judges redistrictings. The numbers in parentheses
give the numerical label of the individual districts as identified in the maps in the Appendix.
The last set of columns contains the mean values for each positon in the ranked ordered vector
containing the percentage of Democratic votes for each redistricting. As already described, the
Gerrymandering Index is Euclidean distance from this vector of marginal means. One can easily
identify the particular districts which have likely been packed or cracked by comparing the values
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Figure 13. We display changes of the distribution of election results with changes to
the compactness threshold (left). The histogram formed with a maximum of 60 for the
isoperimetric ratio overlays this image with the gray shaded histogram. We display changes
to the histogram of the box-plot when comparing a maximum of 60 in the isoperimetric
ratio without any thresholding on compactness (right).
for a given district to this vector of means. In particular, the three most Democratic districts
NC2012 NC2016 Judges Mean
Rank 2012 2016 2012 2016 2012 2016 2012 2016
1 37.5 (3) 34.2 (3) 38.7 (3) 32.8 (3) 35.5 (10) 28.9 (10) 37.0 30.6
2 39.0 (6) 34.6 (11) 42.5 (10) 35.8 (11) 40.0 (2) 33.6 (2) 39.1 33.0
3 42.4 (5) 36.2 (7) 43.7 (6) 36.8 (10) 42.6 (12) 36.3 (7) 41.0 35.3
4 42.5 (11) 36.6 (8) 43.9 (11) 39.0 (7) 42.7 (7) 37.6 (12) 43.7 38.5
5 42.6 (2) 37.4 (10) 44.0 (2) 40.7 (6) 44.5 (9) 40.0 (9) 46.4 40.6
6 43.1 (10) 38.9 (5) 45.1 (5) 41.2 (8) 48.5 (8) 41.9 (3) 48.4 42.2
7 43.5 (13) 40.8 (6) 46.3 (13) 41.6 (5) 48.8 (11) 42.7 (11) 50.2 44.3
8 46.2 (8) 41.2 (2) 47.3 (8) 41.8 (9) 50.5 (4) 45.7 (4) 52.3 47.7
9 46.7 (9) 44.0 (9) 49.4 (9) 43.3 (2) 57.0 (3) 48.1 (8) 55.1 51.2
10 50.1 (7) 45.8 (13) 51.6 (7) 43.9 (13) 57.5 (5) 55.9 (1) 57.2 54.6
11 74.4 (4) 71.5 (1) 66.1 (4) 66.6 (12) 59.2 (1) 59.7 (5) 59.5 57.5
12 76.0 (1) 73.0 (4) 69.8 (12) 68.2 (4) 64.6 (6) 63.3 (13) 62.6 61.4
13 79.3 (12) 75.3 (12) 70.9 (1) 70.3 (1) 66.0 (13) 65.3 (6) 67.5 65.1
Table 1. Percentage of Democratic votes in each district when districts are ranked
from most Republican to most Democratic. Number in parentheses give label of
actual district using the numbering convention from maps in the Appendix. This
data is plotted in Figure 4 and 5 on top of the summary box-plots.
labeled 1, 4 and 12 in both the NC2012 and NC2014 plan have significantly more Democratic
votes. Districts 9 and 13 both show evidence of having less Democrats than one would expect from
their rankings. These conclusions are consistant across the 2012 and 2016 votes.
The raw data used to produce Figure 1 is given in Table 2. It underscores how atypical the
results produced by the NC2012 and NC2016 redistrictings are. If one is ready to accept four seats
in the 2012 vote then one should equally accept nine. Similarly in the 2016 votes, if one accepts
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three as a legitimate outcome then one should also be willing to accept seven seats. None of these
results seem particularly representative of the votes cast.
# of Democratic Winners
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
2012 Votes 0 0 0 89 2875 9455 9690 2288 121 0
2016 Votes 0 1 162 6861 13510 3881 103 0 0 0
Table 2. Among the 24,518 random redistrictings generated, the number which
produced the indicated number of Democratic seats in the Congressional Delegation.
7.3. Independence of initial conditions and simulated annealing parameters. There is
a possible pitfall of using simulated annealing: we may become trapped in local regions, leaving
us unable to explore the entire space of redistrictings. This may be because we have cooled the
system down too quickly, keeping it trapped in a local region, or it may be because the likelihood
of finding a path out of one local region of redistrictings and into another is small. We note that we
have animated our algorithm and have found that districts may travel from one end of the state to
another; such motion suggests that many types of redistrictings are sampled, and it is reasonable
to hypothesize that as districts exchange locations, they lose information on past configurations.
To more fully vet this idea, we examine the effect of (i) choosing a different initial redistricting in
our algorithm, and (ii) doubling the simulated annealing parameters, thus cooling the system down
twice as slowly. To clarify the point (ii), instead of remaining hot (β = 0) for 40,000 steps, cooling
linearly for 60,000 steps, and remaining cold (β = 1) for 20,000 steps, we instead remain hot for
80,000 steps, cool linearly for 120,000 steps, and remain cold for 40,000 steps. We then check to see
if the election results are altered by changing these conditions and display our results in Figure 14.
We find that the changes with respect to both initial conditions and the slowdown of the annealing
process have little effect on the election results. There are slight effects; for example, the initial
condition for the NC2012 redistricting has a 15% chance of electing five Democrats rather than the
12% chance we have seen before. We note that these are exploratory runs, so we have less than
1000 accepted districtings for the NC2012 and NC2016 initial conditions (each has close to 1000)
and less than 2500 runs for the increased cooling times. These sample sizes are robust enough to
provide a general trend but are subject to statistical variations. Hence the small sample sizes are
a possible and likely culprit of these variations.
7.4. Evidence of proper sampling. The above test gives strong evidence that we have properly
sampled the probability distribution of redistrictings. To strengthen this claim, we also continue
to allow the algorithm to sample the space until we have sampled roughly 120 thousand acceptable
redistrictings as defined by the original thresholding criteria. We then compare the results of the
elections along with the box plots and histogram plots. We find that there is negligible change
in the distribution of outcome both for the overall number of elected representatives and for each
ordered district from most to least republican. We display our results in Figure 15. The stability
of these results together with those presented in Section 7.3 provides robust evidence that we have
correctly recovered the underlying probability distribution of redistrictings.
7.5. Varying weights. We have proposed a methodology for determining the weights in the score
function that is primarily concerned with obtaining a high percent of redistrictings below our
chosen threshold values (see Section 3.5). We note that other parameters may be chosen, and
here we test whether making a different choice will affect the statistics on the election outcomes.
We are in a four dimensional space, meaning that the parameter space is very large. Exploring
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Figure 14. We display the probability distribution of elected Democrats with respect to
initial conditions (top left) and the original versus doubled simulated annealing parameters
(bottom left). The histogram formed with the Judges as an initial condition and the pre-
viously reported simulated annealing parameters overlays this image with the gray shaded
histogram. We display our standard box-plots for the three initial conditions as we need
to compare three results rather than two (top right) along with the histogram box-plots to
compare the effect of changing the simulated annealing parameters (bottom right).
this space exhaustively would come at an large computational cost. We instead perform a simple
sensitivity test on our current location in the parameter space by exploring the four dimensional
space in four linearly independent directions. We explore over three directions by significantly
increasing and decreasing wp, wI , and wm. For the fourth direction, we note that we could simply
increase or decrease wc; however, we thought it might be interesting to increase and decrease β
instead. Because changing β is equivalent to changing all parameters, this forms a fourth linearly
independent search direction, and provides us with information similar to changing wc. This leads
us to examine eight different parameter sets, which still requires a large number of runs. To cut
down on the computational cost, we take advantage of the result presented in section 7.1 above,
where we conclude that ignoring the compactness threshold has a minimal effect on our results.
The compactness threshold is by far the most restrictive, so omitting it will allow us to sample
more redistrictings with fewer runs.
We present our results in Figure 16, and find that the results are very robust in all examined
directions of changing parameters. We note, however, that the percentage of redistrictings that falls
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Figure 15. We extend the samples from the main text by allowing the sampling algorithm
to continue until we have sampled roughly 120 thousand districts that fall below the thresh-
old. We find almost no difference between the distributions in the original and extended
samples.
below our compactness acceptance threshold does change with varying parameters. Based on our
result that election results are robust with respect to large changes in the compactness threshold,
we conclude that significant changes in the parameters will have little effect on the statistical results
of the election data.
7.6. Different weights for lower county splits. In the above analysis we have prioritized com-
pact districts over those with low two county splits. The result of this is presented in Figure 9
and Section 4 above, and we note again that the number of two county splits in our samples is
far less than the NC2012 plan, but generally greater than that of NC2016 or the Judges. In this
section we determine the sensitivity of our results when we prioritize keeping a low number of
county splits. To make this examination, we double the county weight (wc = 0.8) and reduce the
compactness weight (wI = 2). By resetting the compactness threshold to be 80, we obtain just
under 15 thousand redistrictings and note that all of them have a worst district better than the
worst NC2016 district. Keeping the threshold at 60 only yields a couple thousand samples, thus in
order to obtain more samples and because we have found that compactness does not have a large
effect on the results, we select the higher threshold. We find that despite changing the weights in
this severe way, the over all election results, in addition to the distribution of results per ordered
district remains remarkably stable (see Figure 17). We also remark that we now have a median of
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Figure 16. We display standard box-plots and demonstrate how the election results
change with respect to changing the values of the weights.
16 two county splits with a mean of 16.5, in contrast with a median of 21 and mean of 21.6 from
the main results presented above.
7.7. Using a different compactness energy. We have used the isoparametric ratio for the
compactness energy however there are other possible choices. Dispersion, mentioned in Section 3,
measures how spread a district is. Typically it is thought of as the ratio between the area of
the minimal bounding circle and the districts area. Although useful as a metric to compare two
districtings, the dispersion score does not minimized for jagged perimeters and cannot be used as a
sufficient criteria to draw reasonable districts. Never-the-less, we examine the space of districts in
which we replace the isoparametric ratios with the dispersion ratio. Given §120-4.52(g)(1) of HB92,
which specifies district length and width, we chose to measure dispersion as the ratio between the
area of the minimal bounding rectangle and the district area. The redistricting plans we arrive
at would never be used due to the jagged perimeters, however if such a drastic change in the
compactness criteria gives similar results to those which we have found before, we would have
stronger evidence still for the robustness of our analysis.
We threshold on everything but compactness as the isoparametric ratios become very high. We
keep the weights the same as in the main results. With the resulting redistricting plans We display
the histogram of the election results and district results and compare them with our main results
in Figure 18. Despite this drastic change in energy definition, we find the results to be remarkably
similar to the main results.
8. Technical Discussions
8.1. Data sources and extraction. The VTD geographic data were taken from the NCGA
website (see [12] from references) and the United States Census Bureau website (see [2] from
references), which provide for each VTD its area, population count of the 2010 census, the county
in which the VTD lies, its shape and location. Perimeter lengths shared by VTDs were extracted
in ArcMap from this data. Minority voting age population was found on the NCGA website using
2010 census data (see [13] from references). Data for the vote counts in each VTD for the 2012
House elections was taken from Harvard’s Election Data Archive Dataverse (see [8] from references).
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Figure 17. By changing the weights on the energy function we alter the distribution of
two county splits (top right). Despite these changes, the over all election results (top left)
and box and box histogram plots by district (bottom) remain stable.
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Figure 18. We change the compactness energy from the isoparametric ratio to a type of
dispersion score. Despite this drastic change in energy definition, we find the results to be
remarkably similar.
Vote count data for the 2016 House elections was provided by NCSBE Public Data (See [19] from
references). We note that for the 2016 election, VTD data was not reported for all VTDs, but rather
for each precinct; 2447 of the precincts are VTDs, meaning that we have data for the majority of
the 2692 VTDs. However 172 precincts contain multiple VTDs, 66 VTDs were reported with split
data, and 7 VTDs were reported with complex relationships. To extrapolate VTD data on those
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contained in the 172 precincts containing multiple VTDs, we split the votes for a precinct among
the VTDs it contained proportional to the population of each VTD. For the split VTDs, those
containing multiple precincts, we simply added up the votes among the precincts it contained.
There was no extrapolation for these VTDs. For the VTDs with complex relationships, we divided
up the votes using estimates based on the geography and population of the VTDs. We note that
roughly 10% of the population lies in the VTDs with imperfect data, and that we do not expect
significant deviation in our results based on the above approximations.
In using 2012 and 2016 data we have only used presidential election year data. Unfortunately,
the 2014 U.S. congressional election in North Carolina contained an unopposed race which prevents
the support for both parties being expressed in the VTDs contained in that district. In reference
[1], the missing votes were replaced with votes from the Senate race. However, since we had two
full elections, namely 2012 and 2016, which needed little to no alterations, we chose not to include
the 2014 votes in our study.
8.2. Examining nearby redistrictings within a distance. The random sampling of the nearby
districts is accomplished by running the same MCMC algorithm described in Section 3.3 with the
small modification that if a proposed step ever tries to increase the deviation between any of the
districts from the original redistricting in question (either NC2012, NC2016, or the Judges) above
40 VTDs, then the step is rejected and the chain does not move on that round. Alternatively, one
can think of J(ξ) =∞ for any ξ ∈ R which has a district that differs from the original redistricting
by more than 40 VTDs. As before, we then threshold the results for NC2016 and the Judges on
the Population Score, the County Score, and the Minority Score as described in Section 3.4. We
do not threshold on the Isoperimetric Score as (i) keeping the redistricting near the original is
likely sufficient and (ii) would be too severe for the NC2016 redistricting. We do not threshold the
NC2012 at all since most of the redistrictings close to NC2012 would fail the Population threshold
since the compactness energy is so large in this region that it overwhelms population considerations.
We examine the difference in the local complementary cumulative distribution function (thresh-
olded and not) to get a sense of how accurate the NC2012 local complementary cumulative distri-
bution function is without thresholding. We find that there is only a modest difference between
the thresheld and non-thresheld results from the Judges which provides evidence that using the
non-thresheld results for NC2012 is unimportant for obtaining a representative space of nearby
districts.
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Figure 19. There is not a large difference between the thresholded and unthresholded results.
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9. Discussion
We have provided a prototype probability distribution on the space of congressional redistrictings
of North Carolina. This distribution is non-partisan in that it considers no information beyond the
total population, shape of the districts, and relevant demographic information for the VRA. The
probability model was then calibrated to produce redistrictings which are comparable to the current
district to the extent they partition the population equally and produce compact districts. Then,
effectively independent draws were made from this probability distribution using the Metropolis-
Hastings variant of Markov chain Monte Carlo. For each redistricting drawn, the 2012 and 2016
U.S. House of Representatives election was retabulated using the actual vote counts to determine
the party affiliation of the winner in each district. The statistics of the number of Democratic
winners gave a portrait of the range of outcomes possible for the given set of votes cast. This
distribution could be viewed as the true will of the people.
Redistricting’s reach is beyond simply the election outcome. By packing and cracking groups,
districts can be made safe, which arguably can shift the ideological center of the candidate elected
away from the most representative positions. Our work also helps to identify when Gerrymandering
has produced districts with unusually large concentrations of one party.
Redistrictings producing outcomes which are significantly different than the typical results ob-
tained from randomly sampled redistrictings are arguably at odds with the will of the people
expressed in the record of their votes. The fact that the election outcomes are so dependent on the
choice of redistrictings demonstrates the need for checks and balances to ensure that democracy is
served when redistrictings are drawn and the election outcome is representative of the votes cast.
It seems unreasonable to expect that politics would not enter into the process of redistricting.
Since the legislators represent the people and presumably express their will, restricting their ability
to express that will seems contrary to the very idea of democracy. Yet the work in this note could
likely be developed into a criteria to decide when a redistricting fails to be sufficiently representative
of the will of the people. It would perhaps be reasonable to only allow redistrictings which yield the
more typical results, eschewing the most atypical as a subversion of the people’s will. This would
still leave plenty of room for politics, but add a counter-weight to balance that role of partisanship
when it acts against the democratic ideals of a republic governed by the people.
The most basic critiques of this work is that we have assumed that the candidate does not matter,
that a vote for the Democrat or Republican will not change, even after the districts are rearranged.
Furthermore, as districts become more polarized and many elections result in a forgone conclusion,
voter turnout is likely suppressed. While we could try to correct for these effects, we find the
simplicity and power of using the actual votes very compelling. The results are both striking and
illuminating.
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Largest AA # Split
Jp JI 1st 2nd Counties
NC2012 1.59×10−2 2068.53 52.54 50.01 40
NC2016 7.93×10−3 699.82 45.10 36.28 13
Judges 4.47×10−3 527.14 41.68 32.96 12
First sample 1.38×10−2 471.8 44.50 36.24 25
Second sample 8.03×10−3 489.44 44.48 36.31 23
Third sample 4.51×10−3 454.37 44.49 36.20 23
Fourth sample 8.98×10−3 465.03 41.65 36.38 24
Fifth sample 4.51×10−3 463.86 42.01 33,06 21
Sixth sample 5.07×10−3 460.12 44.95 36.26 21
Table 3. We display the various energies for each of the districtings that we present in
the appendix. Note that reported numbers for districtings are before VTD splits.
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Figure 20. Map for NC2012. Numbers corespond to labels in Table 1.
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Figure 21. Map for m,NC2016. Numbers corespond to labels in Table 1.
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Figure 22. Map produced by bipartisan redistricting commission of retired Judges
from Beyond Gerrymandering project. Numbers corespond to labels in Table 1.
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Figure 23. First sample redistricting generated by MCMC
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Figure 24. Second sample redistricting generated by MCMC
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Figure 25. Third sample redistricting generated by MCMC
41
Figure 26. Fourth sample redistricting generated by MCMC
42
Figure 27. Fifth sample redistricting generated by MCMC
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Figure 28. Sixth sample redistricting generated by MCMC
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